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This paper discusses how an industrialized country could defend the wages and social benefits 
of its unskilled workers against wage competition from immigrants. It shows that fixing social 
standards harms the workers and that fixing social replacement incomes implies migration 
into unemployment. Defending wages with replacement incomes brings about first-order 
efficiency losses that outweigh the budget cost to the government. By contrast, wage 
subsidies involve much smaller welfare losses. While the exclusion of migrants from a 
national replacement program does not improve the situation, the (temporary) exclusion of 
migrants from a national subsidy program makes it possible to avoid a distortion of the 
migration pattern.  
JEL Code: F15, F22, I38, H5, J61. 
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1. Introduction 
The world is integrating at a rapid pace. Since China and India have decided to 
participate in world trade, since the Iron Curtain has fallen, since the EU has integrated 
its internal market and expanded to the east, and since NAFTA has opened the US to 
trade with Mexico, the relative factor endowments in the market economies linked by 
trade have changed dramatically. Capital has become a scarce factor of production, and 
unskilled labor has become an abundant factor, the scapegoat of an otherwise beneficial 
economic development process. The integration of markets is reaping gains from trade, 
but due to the forces of factor price equalization these gains are accompanied by 
significant income losses of the working classes in the western countries, at least against 
the trend that otherwise would have prevailed. The achievements of a hundred years of 
social democracy are at risk.  
  In principle, the forces that put pressure on the wages of less qualified workers 
in the industrialized countries already come into operation via Heckscher-Ohlin type 
trade specialization and capital movements. However, in many countries they are 
reinforced by migration processes triggered by huge wage differences. The east west 
migration in Europe that has taken place since the fall of the Iron Curtain and will 
continue in the years to come is an example. The average wage of the about 75 million 
people from central eastern Europe that joined the EU in 2004 is about one fifth of the 
EU average and about one seventh of the west German average. After a transition 
period not to last longer than until 2010 workers from the new EU countries will be able 
to offer their services in any of the old EU countries.  4 
  Ordinary workers in the industrialized countries are afraid of what will happen, 
and their fears may well be justified. They will not belong to the winners of this period 
of economic development. The winners are capital owners and skilled workers. It is true 
that market integration is likely to bring about gains from trade, but there are gains from 
trade only in the sense that the winners will gain more than the losers will lose. Gains 
from trade do not come about as Pareto improvements, but rather as Kaldor type gains 
where the winners could compensate the losers although they do not normally do so.  
  From a social perspective, this is truly disquieting. Thus it is understandable that 
the losers appeal to the welfare state to compensate them. The welfare state, however, 
cannot help much since the more it helps the more it will come under pressure itself. 
The theory of systems competition has nothing but discomforting news in this regard. If 
only because of the mobility of labor, the welfare states will rather be engaged in a kind 
of deterrence competition in order to avoid becoming the target of welfare migration.  
  Yet, at least in western Europe, the welfare state is still intact and will exert its 
influence on the migration processes involved. This is the theme of this paper. It is 
about the effects of the welfare state on migration and about possible reforms that may 
help this state to better deal with the redistributive forces of market integration in 
general and labor migration in particular. The paper will look at how existing social 
systems influence immigration and what effect they will exert on the wages of unskilled 
labor. It will then proceed to identify policy measures that would help improve the 
economy’s reaction including those that enable the welfare state to perform its 
compensation function despite the forces of systems competition. 
  While there is a distributional goal for government intervention, it is essential 
that this goal is achieved with the smallest possible loss of utility or income for other 5 
groups of society. Thus, a Kaldorian welfare perspective will be adopted here to assess 
the efficiency cost of the measures considered.  
  The paper complements the existing fiscal competition literature. Where that 
literature deals with the reaction of welfare states to migration, it typically models the 
welfare state as an institution that pays wage subsidies that are added to the wage and 
increase the incentive to migrate into an otherwise well functioning economy with a 
flexible labor market.
1 However, the true welfare state of the European type differs 
substantially from this. First, it offers social replacement incomes to those who do not 
work rather than paying out wage subsidies. Such replacement incomes make wages 
rigid, unable to react to the competitive forces. Second, it sets labor standards defining 
the social environment of jobs. It will be shown that both types of measures bring about 
reactions to the migration pressure that are dissimilar to the wage subsidies studied in 
the literature,
2  notwithstanding the fact that such subsidies would indeed be better tools 
of the welfare state if combined with a Principle of Selectively Delayed Economic 
Integration, as will be shown below.  
  This investigation is phrased in terms of labor migration, because this is where 
policy interferes most with market forces. On the one hand, governments impose 
constraints on migration. On the other, the redistributive fiscal measures of the state 
automatically act as welfare magnets for the poor. If the full gains from trade in goods 
and factors do not materialize in reality it is mostly because government actions distort 
the labor market. Nevertheless, this study is fully compatible with the other forces that 
                                                 
1 See, e.g. Brown and Oates (1987), Wildasin (1991, 1994), Cremer and Pestieau (1996), Wilson (2004) 
and the literature survey by Brueckner (2000).  6 
work towards factor price equalization, provided they are not as perfect as in textbook 
models. It is therefore assumed in this paper that labor migration cannot be fully 
substituted by commodity trade and capital movements and indeed makes a contribution 
to improving the efficiency of the international allocation of resources.  
 
2. The basic model 
To concentrate on the complications of the welfare state measures, the model assumes 
an extremely simple competitive economy as described in the seminal paper by 
Wildasin (1991). The economy produces a homogeneous traded good with only one 
factor, labor, by means of the production function  () f L  with normal properties. 
Workers, the “poor”, earn the wage w  that equals the marginal product of labor, 
() f L ′ =
()
w . The rich who own an immobile factor, say land, earn the remaining income 
f fL ′ − L . Little would change in the model if other mobile factors such as capital 
were assumed in addition, provided that the immobile factor would still be owned by 
the rich. Domestic labor of the amount L is inelastically supplied and so is the 
immobile factor.   
  Similar conditions hold in the rest of the world. Let  ( *) L ϕ  be the corresponding 
production function abroad such that  ( *) * Lw ′ ϕ =  determines the foreign wage and let 
* L be the initial foreign labor endowment. When X denotes the stock of migrants in the 
domestic country and markets clear, then  ,* L * L X LLX = += − . 
                                                                                                                                               
2 See also the non-technical treatment of the theme in Sinn (2003). Sinn and Ochel (2003) discuss 
replacement incomes and social standards from the viewpoint of EU harmonisation measures imposed 
upon accession countries.  7 
  The domestic country is the high-wage country facing immigration pressure. 
Assume therefore that, when migration is prohibited,  * ww > , where w and  * w  are the 
autarky wages defined by  () f Lw ′ =  and  (* ) * Lw ′ ϕ= . (Recall that currently, the 
countries under consideration being, say, west Germany and the new east European EU 
countries,  w is seven times as large as  * w .) The domestic country faces an upward 
sloping migrant supply curve relating the stock of immigrants to its own wage. The 
curve is upward sloping for two reasons. First, the more people come, the scarcer 
becomes labor abroad and the higher therefore the foreign wage of the migrants. 
Second, as people with low migration costs will come first, the marginal cost of 
migration will be the higher the more have already come.  
  To model migration costs, think of the European type of commuter migration 
rather than the American type of permanent immigration. Assume therefore that 
migration costs are a flow that accrues as long as the migrant lives in the host country. 
The costs include the cost of regular home travel, of having to pay higher rent in the 
host country or simply of suffering from homesickness. Let 
( ), (0) 0, 0, 0, X ′ ′′ ψψ = ψ ≥ ψ >  be the aggregate migration cost as a function of the 
stock of migrants such that  () X ′ ψ
C
 is the migration cost of an additional migrant if X 
people have already come. Then, with open borders, the migration equilibrium and the 
corresponding wage w  are given by 
 
(1)     () ( * ) ( C ) . f LX w L X X ′′ +== ϕ −+ ψ ′  
 8 
Obviously this migration equilibrium is efficient. Market forces determine the stock of 
migrants such that international welfare W, defined as the joint GDP net of the 
aggregate migration cost, 
 
(2)       () (* ) ( ) Wf L LX X =+ ϕ − − ψ , 
  
is maximized with regard to X, assuming for the time being that LLX = + , i.e. that all 
immigrants are employed. The marginal migrant who is indifferent between coming and 
staying at home expects a wage increase that just equals his migration cost. As wages 
equal marginal productivities at home and abroad, the wage increase equals the increase 
of the joint GDP, and hence with the marginal migrant the increase in the joint GDP is 




























  Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium. The downward sloping curve is the labor 
demand curve and the upper of the upward sloping curves is the migrant supply curve. 
The demand curve represents the marginal product of labor, and the supply curve 
represents the foreign wage plus the marginal migration cost. When the border is closed, 
the domestic wage rate is wor BJ. Opening the border leads to immigration until the 
point of intersection C of the two curves is reached. Immigration is then JK, the 
domestic wage is w  or CK, and the foreign wage is w* or FK. Despite migration, there 
remains a wage difference equal to CF due to the migration cost. 
C
  Migration generates a welfare gain because all economies involved are now 
better off. Domestic output increases by BCKJ, but as the wage bill of the migrants is 
only DCKJ, there is a surplus BCD for domestic residents. And while foreigners have 10 
an aggregate migration cost HCF and face an output loss equal to HFKJ, the wage 
income they earn in the host country is DCKJ. Thus they collect a migration rent equal 
to DCH.  
  The social problem resulting from this development is the decline in the 
domestic wage, the income of the poor, from w to  . Since firms would replace 
expensive nationals with cheap migrants if domestic wages did not decline, the wage of 
the nationals will fall from 
C w
w to w . This implies a redistribution of income from poor 
to rich nationals in the amount of ABDE: The rich will not only capture the gain BCD 
from employing cheap migrants, but will also enjoy the redistribution gain. The pie  
becomes bigger, but many people will get an absolutely smaller piece. This is the 
problem of market integration as perceived nowadays in the industrialized countries. 




Proposition 1: Migration costs will bring immigration from the low wage country to a 
halt when the wage difference equals the marginal migration cost. Free migration 
maximizes the combined GDP of the countries net of migration cost. The “poor” 
workers in the industrialized countries nevertheless lose, and “rich” residual claimants 





3. Declining social standards  
Under the influence of market forces the social decline may not be limited to pecuniary 
wages, but may also affect work related social standards such as workplace safety 
provisions, injury insurance, pay continuation rules, working time limitations and fringe 
benefits offered by firms such as canteens, sports facilities or nursery facilities. These 
provisions are not gifts by the firms, but wages in kind that generate utility for the 
workers and increase the wage cost to the firms. They are taken into account by workers 
and firms when concluding work contracts, and to the extent they can freely be chosen, 
their provision will probably be affected by the low wage competition provided by the 
immigrants.  
  Suppose a firm incurs a total wage cost w of which the fraction 1  is paid out 
as a pecuniary wage and α is used for the provision of social standards. Assume the 
worker’s money metric utility to be 
−α
( ) U wU w = α⋅
*
. The utility function has the 
properties   and  . Let  0 U′′ < max ( ) 1 U α= α  be the level of α that generates this 
maximum. Thus,   if  and  U = ww * α=α U ww <  if  * α ≠α . In other words, the utility 
function is defined such that the firm’s wage cost can be taken to be the worker’s utility 
if the wage cost is composed optimally from the worker’s point of view. However, if the 
firm chooses a suboptimal combination of pecuniary and non-pecuniary wage 
components, a wedge is driven between the firm’s wage cost and the worker’s monetary 
evaluation of the package offered by the firm. 
  Given the utility of the worker, which is determined in a competitive 
equilibrium, the representative firm chooses α and its employment level L so as to 12 
maximize its profits. As can easily be shown, the necessary conditions for this optimum 
are  
 
   () f LX w ′ + =   and   * α =α . 
 
The first equation is the usual input rule for optimal employment and the second 
equation the condition for minimizing the firm’s wage cost compatible with a given 
utility of the workers. Similar equations hold abroad.  
  Note that the specification chosen implies that  * α  is independent of the wage 
cost. When wages decline due to the competition of immigrants as depicted in Figure 1, 
the firms will reduce both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary components of their wage 
cost. The work related social standards will fall in line with the pecuniary wages 
themselves.  
 
Proposition 2: Immigration of low wage workers will not only depress wages but also 
social standards that are offered by the firms as wages in kind. The market reaction is 
efficient.  
  
  The reduction of social standards would be the result of market forces. Things 
may be different when the social standards are largely defined by law as they are in 
most western countries. Governments followed the market process and fixed those 
standards that exemplary firms had introduced before. This was no problem for 
economic development as long as wages and labor productivity were rising. 
Governments largely secured a development that would have occurred without them. 13 
However, when the historical development process is reversed and wages have to 




4. Defending the social standards  
Governments do not react like firms but tend to stick to the social standards once 
achieved, trying to stem the tide of market integration. They do so because they want to 
protect the working classes. In fact, however, they may harm them. 
  If governments fix α⋅  despite the decline in w brought about by the market, 
they will enforce a suboptimal combination of pecuniary wages and social standards, 
reducing the money metric utility of workers for any given level of w below 
w
w, and the 
more so, the lower w. This will indeed harm the workers. On the other hand, the 
incentive to immigrate will be reduced so that the wage cost will not be driven down 
that far. The migration equilibrium, which is illustrated in Figure 2, is defined by  
 






















  If a suboptimal choice of   is possible, welfare in general is given by   α
  
    () ( ) (* ) ( ) U L w w L LX X =− −+ ϕ − − ψ Wf  
 
instead of (2). As  , welfare is smaller than it could be. Figure 2 illustrates this. 
The wedge that is driven between the firms’ labor cost and the workers’ money metric 
utility is NP. It implies that migration is less than optimal, and the migrants and the 
nationals receive less utility from the wage cost borne by the firms than they would 
have received with an efficient combination of pecuniary and non-pecuniary wage 
elements. The migrants’ total loss relative to the optimum is DCPQ. Rich nationals face 
higher wage costs and therefore suffer an income loss equal to GNCE. And the 
U w < w15 
domestic workers that were to be protected also suffer from a lower money metric 
wage. Relative to the first best migration equilibrium they lose utility as measured in 
monetary units by the area EDQI. The aggregate welfare loss is the sum of these areas, 
GNCPI.  
  The result is rather catastrophic. Analytically it is the same as if the government 
had implemented an immigration tax of size NP per immigrant and thrown away the tax 
revenue. A normal immigration tax would have resulted in a welfare loss of size NCP, 
but throwing the tax revenue away increases this loss by GNPI.  
 
  A proposition summarizes these findings. 
Proposition 3: When immigration depresses domestic wages, governments should also 
allow for a decline of labor standards. If they nevertheless defend the labor standards 
that would have been optimal without immigration, immigration will be too low, 
immigrants and domestic workers will have a lower utility, and rich nationals will earn 
lower income.  
 
5. Fixing replacement incomes 
Let us now turn to social replacement incomes. In the past, social replacement incomes 
like unemployment benefits and welfare payments have largely followed the evolution 
of wages. Unemployment benefits did so automatically, and welfare payments were 
adjusted by political decisions. Both represent lower bounds on wages, which hamper 
the market adjustment to immigration and lead to a different development of the labor 
market from that described in Figure 1.  16 
  Western governments have tended to defend replacement incomes despite the 
wage inflexibility this has created. In Germany, for example, the government has even 
increased welfare much faster than average wages over the last three decades with the 
consequence of creating mass unemployment among the less skilled and making the 
country world champion in this regard (Sinn 2003). As mentioned in the introduction, 
this kind of reaction has little resemblance with the kind of government interventions 
considered in the fiscal competition literature.  
  Abstract from the problem of setting false standards (i.e. assume that α=α ) 
and let 
*
R be the replacement income per person offered by the government. The 
replacement income is financed with taxes on the rich. Assume for the moment that the 
replacement income is available to nationals as well as immigrants. This assumption 
will be relaxed in the next section. Let  C R w ≥  so that the replacement income is 
effectively binding domestic wages from below. No one will be willing to work for a 
wage that is lower than what the government pays for not working, and the government 
pays more than the market would have determined after immigration. Under these 
conditions, the number of available jobs will not be sufficient to accommodate the 
migrants. This is so a fortiori, as the replacement income will also act as an immigration 
magnet, attracting more workers than would have come under a pure market solution. 
The migration equilibrium is now given by  
 
(3)     () (* ) ( ) . f LR LX X ′′ ′ == ϕ − + ψ  
 17 
Replacement incomes result in immigration into unemployment, as the work force 
available in the domestic country is LX + , while the workers’ incentive constraint 
 implies that  wR ≥ LLX <+when  C R w > . Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium with 




























  The equilibrium deviates substantially from the efficient immigration 
equilibrium shown in Figure 1 and characterized by point C. On the one hand, 
employment is lower implying a comparative output loss of size B’CKJ’. On the other 
hand, immigration is higher by the amount KY. Higher immigration implies less 
production abroad and higher migration costs. The sum of these two disadvantages 18 
relative to the optimum is shown by the area CTYK. Thus, the total welfare loss relative 
to the efficient migration pattern is B’CTYJ’.  
  The only advantage of this kind of government intervention is that it succeeds in 
defending the living standard of the poor. However, the disadvantage is a double 
welfare loss insofar as the policy destroys jobs at home and nevertheless brings in 
additional workers from abroad. It would obviously always be better from an 
international welfare perspective to defend a certain wage of the domestic poor by 
immigration controls than by using a replacement strategy. If such a policy would 
effectively defend the autarky wage, R w = , it would be so catastrophic that it would 
even be better to keep the borders closed. While migrants would add nothing to the 
domestic GDP in either case, the migration costs and the foreign output loss due to the 
emigrating labor could be avoided.  
 
Proposition 4: Defending low domestic wages with replacement incomes prevents the 
creation of additional jobs for the migrants and attracts more immigrants than would 
have come in a laissez faire equilibrium. There is immigration into unemployment. 
From an international welfare perspective, the policy is worse than supporting the same 
wage of the poor by means of immigration controls because it lures people away from 
productive foreign activities without providing them with additional domestic jobs.  
 
  The welfare loss is huge also relative to the budget cost of the replacement 
incomes. In the figure, the budget cost is equal to B’TYJ’. This differs from the 
international welfare loss only by the triangle B’TC, and this triangle is relatively 
smaller the less the replacement income R deviates from the undistorted equilibrium 19 
wage  . In fact, in the limit, as R approaches   from above, the relative size of the 
triangle shrinks to zero. 
C w C w
  A more precise analysis that looks at the marginal impact of a change in R on the 
international welfare cost and the budget is as follows. The government’s budget cost 
under the replacement strategy,  R B , is given by  
 
(4)       ( ) R B RR =⋅ Ω  
where 
(5)       () () () R LX R L R Ω= + −  
 
is the level of unemployment as a function of R with ( ) X R  and   denoting the 
implicit effect on migration and domestic employment of R as given by (3). Obviously, 
it follows from equation (3) that  
( ) LR
 

















′′ ′′ ψ− ϕ−
 
  
  Differentiating equation (4) with respect to R using (5) yields   
 







′′ =Ω+ ⋅ −  , 20 
and differentiating the international welfare function (2) with respect to R (where it is no 









f LLR L X X X R
R
RX R L R
′′ ′ ′ ′ =− ϕ − + ψ
′′ =− ⋅ −
 
 
It follows from (6) and (7) that the marginal welfare effect of an increase in the 
government’s expenditure resulting from an increase in the replacement income R is 
given by  
 














In the limiting case where the replacement income equals the wage in a first best 
migration equilibrium and where there is hence no unemployment, Ω= , this 
derivative simplifies to: 
0
 






=− for  C R w = . 
 
It follows by continuity arguments that a “small” effective replacement strategy to 
protect domestic wages incurs a welfare loss that is equal to its budget cost. What this 
means is that if God provided the national government with an additional euro to be 21 
spent on replacement incomes, the domestic and foreign private sectors as a whole 
would not be better off in terms of a Kaldorian efficiency view. Private agents would 
change their behavior in such a way as to destroy exactly one euro of economic 
resources.  
  It may also be useful to translate this into the more familiar notion of the 
marginal cost of public funds, M. Suppose the government gains an additional euro by 
curtailing replacement incomes (d 0 R B < ). The marginal cost of this euro to the private 
sector is the liquidity cost plus the marginal welfare loss which in the present case is 
negative, however. It follows from (9) that the marginal cost of public funds generated 
by a cut in replacement incomes is given by:  
 







≡+ =   for  C R w = . 
 
Thus there are no private costs in the efficiency sense if the government gains funds by 
curtailing a small replacement program. Instead of running a small replacement income 
program it could throw away the money that otherwise would have been given to the 
unemployed, and the private sector as a whole would not be worse off. This, too, 
demonstrates how absurd the replacement strategy is from an efficiency point of view.  
 
Proposition 5: The international welfare loss of a small program of social replacement 
incomes is about equal to the budget cost of this program, and the marginal cost of 
public funds gained by curtailing such a program is zero from an international welfare 
perspective. 22 
  Rather than from an international welfare perspective, the problem might also be 
studied from a national welfare perspective. Unlike (2), national welfare, W , is national 
output minus the income earned by foreigners, which is either the replacement income 
or a wage of the same size if the replacement income is a binding constraint on wages: 
n
 
(11)      ,   ( ) n Wf L R X =− ⋅ , R w =  for   C R w ≥  . 
 
  It was shown above that, from an international welfare perspective, the 
replacement strategy is inferior to a policy of immigration controls that defends the 
same wage. Equation (11) makes it clear that the same holds true from a national 
welfare perspective. While domestic employment L and the payment per immigrant, w 
or R, respectively, would be the same, immigration controls imply less immigration and 
hence lower national expenses for foreigners. National welfare is higher.  
  To calculate the marginal effect on national welfare of a budget expansion, note 
that, because of (3), the derivative of (11) with respect to R can be expressed as  
 





R XR LR X
R
′′ =− ⋅ − −  . 
 
The first term of this equation measures the additional expenses resulting from the 
increase in unemployment, given R, and the second term measures the increase in the 
migrants’ replacement income or wage, given the number of migrants. Because of (3) 
and (6), and analogously to (8), one gets  
 23 





WX R X L )
) B RX L
′ ′ + ⋅−
=−
′ ′ Ω+ ⋅ −
  .  
 
This expression takes on a value of  1 −  if the government defends the pre-immigration 
wage,  R w = , for in that case immigration goes fully into additional unemployment, 
X =Ω. For smaller values of R, however, the expression is even more strongly 
negative, since   shrinks faster than X if the economy approaches the first best 
equilibrium as given by point C in the figure. Thus, if God provided the government 
with an additional euro in a situation where unemployment is less than immigration, not 
only would the euro be wasted on a payment for unemployment, but in addition, 
nationals would lose because the euro would be used to bid up the wages earned by 
immigrants at the expense of their national employers. Thus the gift of a euro to the 
national government that the government then uses to expand its replacement program 
would make nationals worse off from a Kaldorian efficiency perspective.  
Ω
  Translated into a national concept of the marginal cost of public funds,  n M , 
similar to (10), it follows that  
 
    0, nC M Rw R w
==  
⇔≥   <<  
. 
 
Thus, from a national perspective, the marginal cost of public funds is zero when the 
government begins to dismantle a replacement income that equals the autarky wage, and 
the marginal cost will even be negative if a less extensive replacement wage strategy is 
pursued. This is the world of Cockaigne for a government that pursues the rules of 24 
optimal tax theory. When public funds were taken away from the replacement program 
to finance the provision of public goods, private nationals would be strictly better off 
even if the public goods were perfectly useless. The government could use the money 
saved to make lump sum gifts to foreign residents which would not affect the migration 
volume, and yet domestic residents as a whole would be better off.  
  The result is demonstrated in Figure 3. Suppose the government completely 
abolishes the replacement program such that the economy moves from points B’ and T 
on the labor demand and supply curves towards the intersection point C and uses the 
budgetary funds set free for purposes that do not provide utility to nationals. In this case 
nationals would nevertheless gain, because the rent from employing foreigners at a 
wage that equals the marginal product of labor would rise. Before the abolition of the 
replacement program, this rent is BB’D’. After its abolition it is BCD. Thus nationals 
enjoy a Kaldorian welfare gain equal to D’B’CD, notwithstanding the fact, of course, 
that there is a redistribution from poor to rich nationals of size ZD’DE.  
 
Proposition 6: With free migration the national welfare loss of a program of social 
replacement incomes is larger than the budget cost of this program. The national 
marginal social cost of public funds gained by curtailing such a program is negative if 
the program is less generous than necessary to defend the autarky wage. If the 
replacement program is generous enough to support the autarky wage, the marginal 
national welfare loss from spending money on the program is minus one, and the 
national marginal social cost of public funds gained by curtailing the program is zero. 
Also from a national welfare perspective the replacement strategy is inferior to 
immigration controls as a tool to defend the national wage of low-income workers.    25 
6. Excluding the non-working migrants 
Thus far it has been assumed that migrants are fully included in the welfare measures of 
the state, in particular that they have full access to the replacement incomes offered by 
the government. This is not typically the case, however, since most states do not allow 
foreigners to directly immigrate into their welfare systems. For example, according to 
EU rules, welfare benefits and similar replacement incomes are limited to workers. 
Those who immigrate without working, will not, in general, be entitled to social aid or 
other replacement incomes. It is true that the inclusion rules as defined in the new EU 
Constitution of June 2004 and the EU Directive on Free Movement of May 2004 have 
become much more generous in this regard recently. Nevertheless, at least in the past, 
only workers were given full access to the benefits of the welfare state.  
  At first glance, it might seem that with this modification a much more favorable 
migration pattern would result. For example, one might suspect that in Figure 3 
immigration would only be JJ’, since additional workers find no jobs, or that only some 
of the J’Y immigrants not needed by the labor market would come since they would 
weight, in a Harris-Todardo fashion, the domestic wage with the probability of finding a 
job, where the probability is given by one minus the unemployment rate. However, such 
considerations do not apply since the welfare state is available to the domestic 
unemployed.  
  In general, labor markets do not ration employment by seniority rules or 
randomly, but inversely to the reservation wages. The labor market functions just like 
any other market. Given the market price, the high cost suppliers, whose average 
variable cost is above the market price, are out, while the low cost suppliers whose 
average variable cost is below that price, are in.  26 
  When the government limits the payment of replacement incomes to domestic 
workers, these workers have a reservation wage equal to the replacement income. They 
are the high cost suppliers who are rationed first. By contrast, the immigrants, who are 
not eligible for welfare, have lower reservations wages, determined by the sum of the 
foreign wage and the marginal migration cost. Thus, all immigrants find jobs, and 
domestic workers service whatever is left of the firms’ aggregate demand. The 












Replacement Incomes only for Domestic Residents:







  Figure 4 illustrates this. The figure resembles Figure 3, but explicitly draws in 
the market supply curve for the domestic labor market. With the given replacement 
income R, domestic workers have a horizontal labor supply curve up to their capacity 
constraint L . The JY immigrants, though, all have lower reservation wages, as depicted 27 
by the immigration labor supply curve HT. This segment of the immigrants’ labor 
supply curve therefore constitutes the inframarginal part H’T’ of the aggregate labor 
supply curve. After this segment comes a horizontal stretch, TT’=L , which reflects the 
domestic workers’ segment of the supply curve. Thereafter, to the right of T, the 
aggregate supply curve continues with those foreign workers who, because they have 
reservation wages above R, do not migrate. It follows that only T’B’ domestic workers 
are employed, and B’T domestic workers are being crowded out into unemployment.   
  There still is immigration into unemployment triggered by the welfare state, but 
it is indirect immigration, pushing domestic residents out of their jobs. In order for the 
economy to create jobs for the immigrants, wages would have to fall, but they cannot do 
so because the fixed replacement income offered by the government makes domestic 
workers the marginal suppliers in the market. Rather than participating in low wage 
competition with the migrants, nationals will accept to be seated in the easy chair 
offered by the welfare state, but as long as not all of them are crowded out by the 
migrants, they will prevent the wage rate from falling after immigration.  
  To avoid crowding out nationals, a combination of wage freeze and dismissal 
protection is sought in most industrialized countries. In theory, this could reverse the 
market rationing scheme and it could protect the domestic workers by effectively 
differentiating wages similar to a price discriminating monopolist. However, this can at 
best be a temporary solution since despite dismissal protection there is a natural 
exchange in the labor market due to stochastic personal events that force people to quit 
jobs or due the normal generational exchange of the workforce. The flow of domestic 
residents offering their services in the labor market will go directly into unemployment 
before the wage can fall due to the competition of immigrants. Only if the flow of 28 
immigrants is larger than the flow of new domestic workers seeking jobs, will there be a 
pressure on wages that could possibly create more jobs. However, this is an unlikely 
condition. In Germany, for example, 7 million people per year lose their jobs and 7 
million find new ones, but the flow of immigrants is in the order of only a few hundreds 
of thousands.  
  Within the present model, the limited inclusion rights of foreigners have no 
welfare implications, and in fact they imply no modifications of any of the equations set 
up above. As the wage that lures the migrants still equals the replacement income R, the 
size of migration is the same as before. The assumption that the immigrants rather than 
the nationals suffer from unemployment was never needed, and the rationing pattern 
was indeterminate anyway.  
 
Proposition 7: If immigrants are not eligible for wage replacement incomes, they will 
indirectly migrate into unemployment, crowding out national residents from the labor 
market. The wage will not be able to fall below the reservation wage set by the 
government, unless all national low-income workers have been crowded out by the 
immigrants. The welfare analysis of a restriction of replacement incomes to nationals 
does not differ from the case where non-employed immigrants are fully included.  
 
  The identity of the welfare calculation would no longer hold, if  domestic 
residents were assumed to prefer being unemployed and collecting replacement income 
rather than earning this income with their own work. In that case, there would be a 
slight advantage from excluding the foreigners from directly migrating into the welfare 
state. However, the reservation wages of domestic workers would be higher and even 29 
more immigration would be induced. Insofar a less disastrous migration pattern could 
hardly be expected than the one described by the model.  
  The reality of welfare states speaks a clear language in this regard. Germany, for 
example, had immigration of 7.6 million people from 1970 to 2002 of which about 3.1 
million entered official employment. At the same time, mass unemployment occurred. 
Whereas there had hardly been any unemployment in 1970 (150,000), by 2002 
unemployment among nationals had increased by 3.2 million people. Although no 
proof, the coincidence between these numbers is remarkable. It fits the very generous 
German system of social aid that provides an income for a family of four that is more 
than four times the Polish wage. It also fits the observation that Germany had increased 
its welfare level by 450% from 1970 to 2000 while industrial wages in the same period 
of time had increased by 350% “only”. With the generous expansion of the welfare state 
since the 1970s, Germany compressed its wage scale from below while the country 
experienced mass immigration. Small wonder that mass unemployment resulted.  
 
7. Wage subsidies  
Social replacement payments are made to individuals on condition that they do not 
work. Thus it should not be surprising that the welfare implications are so unfavorable. 
  Subsidies which are not conditioned on idleness might be a better means to 
protect domestic workers from the forces of low wage competition. As mentioned in the 
introduction most of the literature on welfare state competition has modeled the welfare 
state as an institution that pays subsidies to the poor and recently Drèze (2002) has 
advocated subsidies as a means to defend European workers against the forces of 
globalization. Let S be a personal subsidy like the US Earned Income Tax Credit which 30 
is available to a low income worker and assume for the time being that this subsidy is 
provided to nationals and immigrants alike. If applied in Europe, this assumption would 
reflect the strict non-discrimination rules of the EU that allow for a distinction between 
employed nationals and non-employed immigrants, but not between employed nationals 
and employed immigrants. Then, instead of (1) or (3) the migration equilibrium is given 
by 
 
(12)       () ( * ) ( ) f LX S L X X ′′ ++ = ϕ −+ ψ ′ , 
 
where the market wage under the subsidy scheme satisfies the condition 
() S f LX w ′ += and a worker’s income including the subsidy is  SS wwS = + . 
  This policy measure does not create unemployment, but since it raises the 
income of workers above the marginal product of labor, it attracts additional workers 
from abroad. Only to the extent that the reservation wages of these workers are being 
pushed up due to an increased labor scarcity abroad and increased marginal migration 
costs will the policy succeed in raising or defending the standard of living of the 

























  Figure 5 illustrates the immigration equilibrium. The subsidy drives a wedge of 
size S or M’Q’ between the required marginal compensation of migrants – the sum of 
the foreign marginal product of labor and the marginal migration cost – and the 
marginal domestic product of labor. Compared to laissez faire, it induces additional 
immigration KY’. While the domestic wage falls from  to  , the income of 
domestic workers rises to 
C w S w
S w . With a sufficiently generous subsidy it would be possible 
to fully protect the incomes of domestic workers from the competition of migration, 
pushing them back to the autarky level w. 
  From an international welfare perspective, the subsidy strategy seems less 
problematic than the replacement strategy since employment is higher and no human 
resources are wasted. However, there is a welfare loss insofar as immigration exceeds 
the optimum, which means that the additional migrants produce less in the host country 32 
than would be required to compensate for the loss in foreign production plus the 
migration cost. In Figure 5, the welfare loss is given by the triangle CM’Q’.  
  Figure 5 suggests that the welfare loss is small relative to the budget cost 
A’M’Q’I’ when S is small. To verify this, consider the budget cost  
 
(13)     () () S B SLX S =⋅ +   
 
where ( ) X S  is the functional relationship between S and X as implied by (12) which 
satisfies  
 
(14)    
1
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Differentiating (13) and the welfare function (2) with respect to S, using (12) and (14) 
yields 
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Using (12), these two equations together can be shown to imply 
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In the limiting case where   this indeed reduces to   0 S =
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rather than   as with the replacement strategy. Accordingly, the marginal cost of 
public funds generated by curtailing a small subsidy program is one,  
1 −
 







≡+ =  for   0 S = , 
 
rather than zero as before. This is the usual result for small deviations from the first best 
allocative optimum. As the welfare loss is a second order effect, it can be neglected for 
small government interventions.  
 
Proposition 8: Wage subsidies can be used to protect the living standard of low income 
earners, but they imply excessive immigration. Small subsidies involve only second-
order international welfare effects such that the marginal international cost of public 
funds generated by curtailing a small subsidy program is about one.   
 34 
  Things are different from a national welfare perspective. With regard to national 
welfare, a subsidy strategy is an expensive way to support the workers’ wages because 
the country could try to exploit a monopsony position with regard to the immigrants, 
and for that purpose a tax on workers rather than a subsidy would be optimal from a 
Kaldorian efficiency perspective. National welfare is defined as the difference between 
national output and the wage and subsidy income paid out to migrants:  
 
(15)     ( ) () nS Wf L XX wS =+ − ⋅ +   . 
 
As can easily be demonstrated, the situation where W is maximized and hence 
, is characterized by a negative value of S. The dashed marginal 
expenditure curve ME in Figure 5 sketches the argument showing the optimal tax N’P’, 
i.e. the optimal size of the negative subsidy. Distorting the laissez faire equilibrium with 
a subsidy for workers would therefore involve a first order rather than a second order 
welfare loss from a national perspective.  
n
d/ d nS WB = 0
C
  Nevertheless, the subsidy strategy is a more rational strategy than the 
replacement income strategy to defend the wages of the poor against the competition of 
migrants for the simple reason that domestic output is higher. Suppose both strategies 
target the same income level for domestic workers, i.e. suppose that  
 
(16)       S R wS w =+ > such that  ( ) ( ) X RX S = . 
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In this case both the replacement strategy and the subsidy strategy result in the same 
migration volume, the same loss in foreign output and the same income earned by 
foreigners. However, as domestic employment and output is higher with the subsidy 
strategy, inspection of the welfare functions (2), (11) and (15) shows that both 
international and national welfare would be higher under the subsidy strategy by the 
additional domestic output that this strategy allows to be produced.  
  As output is higher while the income of national workers and migrants is the 
same, it is clear that the “rich” domestic residual claimants will be better off with the 
subsidy strategy regardless of which of the strategies has a lower budget cost and hence 
involves lower taxes on the rich.  
  Interestingly enough, it also follows immediately from (12), (15) and (16) that 
migration controls that target the same income for the domestic poor would even be 
better than subsidies from a national perspective.
3 Such controls would involve lower 
domestic output, but as the excluded migrants all have a marginal product below this 
target income, the output loss would be more than outweighed by the lower income 
payments to migrants. However, migration controls are no solution to the problem of 
protecting the income of the poor when there is migration, as was assumed in this paper.  
  Returning to the comparison between the replacement and the subsidy strategies, 
it might be interesting to know which strategy will incur the lower budget cost. 
Comparing (4) and (5) with (13) shows that  
 
                                                 
3 See Wilson (2004) for a comparison of migration controls and subsidies in a similar model framework.  36 
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Taking account of (16) and noting that, by assuming equal target incomes for the poor, 
() () X SX R = , this expression can be transformed to  
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Note that the right-hand side of this expression is the absolute value of the elasticity of 
the firms’ labor demand curve: The subsidy strategy is accompanied by a wage rate that 
is lower by the amount S than with the replacement strategy and generates a higher 
employment volume, just enough to eliminate the unemployment that would result from 
the replacement strategy,  () () LX R L R +− . Obviously, therefore, the denominator of 
the expression indicates a relative wage decline and the numerator the corresponding 
relative employment increase, the ratio of these values being the elasticity of the labor 
demand curve.  
  The size of the aggregate labor demand elasticity is not quite clear empirically, 
and specific elasticities for the low wage sector are particularly scarce. The elasticity 
level also depends on the time perspective. In the short run it is smaller than in the long 
run, because in the long run other factors, which have not been included here formally, 
may also change. In the limiting case, where capital movements and/or Heckscher-37 
Ohlin specialization effects are sufficient to bring about factor price equalization, the 
labor demand elasticity would even be infinite. As a rule of thumb, the elasticity is 
about unity in the medium term and greater than one in the long term perspective.
4 This 
in itself suggests that the subsidy strategy will be accompanied by the same or even 
smaller budget costs than the replacement strategy.  
 
Proposition 9: From a national perspective, wage subsidies are problematic means to 
defend the income of the poor, since wage taxes would allow the country to exploit a 
monopsony position relative to the emigration countries. Yet, the subsidy strategy 
clearly outperforms the replacement strategy insofar as, with a given income being 
secured for the poor, both national and international welfare will be higher. When the 
elasticity of labor demand is above unity in absolute terms, the subsidy strategy will 
even be cheaper for the government. From a national welfare perspective, migration 
controls dominate subsidies and replacement incomes as measures to defend the income 
of the poor.  
 
 
8. Selectively delayed integration and home country principle 
While migration controls dominate the subsidy strategy in terms of defending the 
income of the national poor with a minimum cost to other groups of the society, they 
imply throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The gains from trade that market 
integration promises would not be available with such a measure. A yet better strategy 
                                                 
4 See Burgess (1988), Franz and König (1986) or Nickel and Symons (1990).  38 
that outperforms all policy measures considered thus far is to differentiate incomes 
between immigrants and nationals. Dismissal protection plus wage freeze is one way of 
differentiation, but as argued above, it does not work well because of natural job 
fluctuation. A differentiation by nationality, on the other hand, would be easier to 
administer. 
  The Principle of Selectively Delayed Integration of employed immigrants has 
been suggested for this purpose.
5 According to this principle, immigrant workers do pay 
their taxes and social security contributions, they receive all contribution-financed 
social benefits, and they have free access to the public infrastructure. However, during 
some initial waiting period some of the tax-financed social benefits are excluded so as 
to avoid making gifts to the migrants. In addition, the Home Country Principle could be 
used for welfare payments to non-employed immigrants, which means that these 
immigrants would have to claim support from the emigration country if they are needy.
6   
  Such a solution would obviously be compatible with a first best migration 
equilibrium as depicted in Figure 1, since it would not interfere with the marginal 
conditions of that solution. The redistribution loss ABDE resulting from the competition 
of migrants could be avoided by paying the subsidy to the nationals only. The 
government could effectively compensate the losers of market integration without 
making them the marginal, high-cost suppliers in the labor market. The tax revenue 
needed to finance this compensation would be levied on the rich. The rich would 
                                                 
5 Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2001), Sinn, Flaig, Werding et al. 




nevertheless gain from market integration because they could capture the rent BCD 
from employing the migrants, and the foreigners would receive their migration rent 
DCH as was explained above.  
 
Proposition 10: A simple and efficient way to defend the incomes of the poor against 
the low-wage competition of migrants would be the payment of wage subsidies coupled 
with the Principle of Selectively Delayed Integration for employed migrants and the 
Home Country Principle for non-employed migrants.  
 
 
9. Concluding remarks 
This paper has analyzed the possibilities to defend the wages of the poor against the 
low-wage competition of migrants. Defending social standards or replacement incomes 
were shown to be very inefficient ways for the government to proceed. The maintenance 
of standards makes the poor worse off than without government action, and replacement 
incomes are so extremely inefficient that the marginal cost of public funds generated by 
dismantling them would be close to zero from an international, and even negative from 
a national, welfare perspective. Wage subsidies, if possible ones that are restricted to the 
domestic population, turned out to be much better alternatives from the point of view of 
economic efficiency and the size of the government expenses necessary to defend a 
given income level. 
                                                                                                                                               
6 Sinn (1990, 2002). See also an extensive treatment of this issue in the context of EU legislation in 
Sinn (2003). 40 
  As has been pointed out elsewhere, wage subsidies that are limited to nationals 
would, in addition, have the advantage of not being eroded by the forces of systems 
competition. As migrants do not cause public resource costs, there would be no 
incentive for governments to participate in a game of deterrence with regard to 
migration flows.  
  There would, however, be legal problems when it comes to intra-EU migration. 
Currently, EU rules forbid the discrimination of employed immigrants by excluding 
them from some of the benefits the welfare state is offering. It is true that the UK and 
Ireland have succeeded in negotiating exclusion rules before agreeing to the draft of the 
new EU constitution. However, Article II 34 of that constitution explicitly excludes 
similar exceptions in the future. It remains to be seen whether the new constitution will 
be ratified by the countries of Europe. If so, the discrimination strategy would no longer 
be feasible. In that case only the other solutions discussed in this paper would remain. 
Basically this means that the replacement strategies should be abandoned and that 
governments should make no particular attempt to defend social standards. Only a 
limited program of income subsidies to the poor would be compatible with a roughly 
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